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Books
Game Theory
Chaotic Elections! A Mathematician Looks at Voting
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Author: Donald G. Saari
Brand: Brand: American Mathematical Society

What does the 2000 U.S. presidential election have in common with selecting a textbook for a calculus course in your department? Was Ralph Nader's influence on the election of George W. Bush greater than the nowfamous chads? In Chaotic Elections!, Don Saari analyzes these questions, placing them in the larger context of voting systems in general. His analysis shows that the fundamental problems with the 2000 presidential election are not with the courts, recounts, or defective ballots, but are caused by the very way Americans vote for president. This expository book shows how mathematics can help to identify and characterize a disturbingly large number of paradoxical situations that result from the choice of a voting procedure. Moreover, rather than being able to dismiss them as anomalies, the likelihood of a dubious election result is surprisingly large. These consequences indicate that election outcomeswhether for president, the site of the next Olympics, the chair of a university department, or a prize winnercan differ from what the voters really wanted. They show that by using an inadequate voting procedure, we can, inadvertently, choose badly. To add to the difficulties, it turns out that the mathematical structures of voting admit several strategic opportunities, which are described. Finally, mathematics also helps identify positive results: By using mathematical symmetries, we can identify what the phrase "what the voters really want" might mean and obtain a unique voting method that satisfies these conditions. Saari's book should be required reading for anyone who wants to understand not only what happened in the presidential election of 2000, but also how we can avoid similar problems from appearing anytime any group is making a choice using a voting procedure. Reading this book requires little more than high school mathematics and an interest in how the apparently simple situation of voting can lead to surprising paradoxes.
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Game Theory and its Applications: In the Social and Biological Sciences (International Series in Social Psychology)
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Author: Andrew M. Colman
Brand: Brand: Psychology Press

Andrew Coleman provides an accessible introduction to the fundamentals of mathematical gaming and other major applications in social psychology, decision theory, economics, politics, evolutionary biology, philosophy, operational research and sociology.
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An Introduction To Gametheoretic Modelling
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Author: Michael Mesterton Gibbons

This book is about using game theory in mathematical modelling. It is an introductory text, covering the basic ideas and methods of game theory as well as the necessary ideas from the vast spectrum of scientific study where the methods are applied. It has by now become generally apparent that game theory is a fascinating branch of mathematics with both serious and recreational applications. Strategic behavior arises whenever the outcome of an individual's action depends on actions to be taken by other individuals  whether human, as in the Prisoners' Dilemma, or otherwise, as in the 'duels of damselflies'. As a result, gametheoretic mathematical models are applicable in both the social and natural sciences.In reading this book, you can learn not just about game theory, but also about how to model real situations so that they can be analyzed mathematically. MestertonGibbons includes the familiar game theory examples where they are needed for explaining the mathematics or when they provide a valuable application. There are also plenty of new examples, in particular from biology, such as competitions for territory or mates, games among kin versus games between kin, and cooperative wildlife management. Prerequisites are modest. Students should have some mathematical maturity and a familiarity with basic calculus, matrix algebra, probability, and some differential equations.As MestertonGibbons writes, 'The recurring theme is that game theory is fun to learn, doesn't require a large amount of mathematical rigor, and has great potential for application'. This new edition contains a significant amount of updates and new material, particularly on biological games. An important chapter on population games now has virtually all new material. The book is absolutely uptodate with numerous references to the literature. Each chapter ends with a commentary which surveys current developments.
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Evolutionary Game Theory, Natural Selection, and Darwinian Dynamics
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Author: Thomas L. Vincent
Brand: Brand: Cambridge University Press

All of life is a game, and evolution by natural selection is no exception. The evolutionary game theory developed in this 2005 book provides the tools necessary for understanding many of nature's mysteries, including coevolution, speciation, extinction and the major biological questions regarding fit of form and function, diversity, procession, and the distribution and abundance of life. Mathematics for the evolutionary game are developed based on Darwin's postulates leading to the concept of a fitness generating function (Gfunction). Gfunction is a tool that simplifies notation and plays an important role developing Darwinian dynamics that drive natural selection. Natural selection may result in special outcomes such as the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). An ESS maximum principle is formulated and its graphical representation as an adaptive landscape illuminates concepts such as adaptation, Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection, and the nature of life's evolutionary game.
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
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Author: John von Neumann

This is the classic work upon which modernday game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yieldedgame theoryhas since been widely used to analyze a host of realworld phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences. This sixtieth anniversary edition includes not only the original text but also an introduction by Harold Kuhn, an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein, and reviews and articles on the book that appeared at the time of its original publication in the New York Times, tthe American Economic Review, and a variety of other publications. Together, these writings provide readers a matchless opportunity to more fully appreciate a work whose influence will yet resound for generations to come.
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003: Game Equilibrium Models III: Strategic Bargaining
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The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of noncooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as noncooperative games. General models of twoperson and nperson bargaining are explored.


1: Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics
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There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the longterm outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.


Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability (Lecture Notes in Economics & Mathematical Systems)
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Author: Immanuel M. Bomze

These Lecture Notes arose from discussions we had over a working paper written by the first author in fall 1987. We decided then to write a short paper about the basic structure of evolutionary stability and found ourselves ending up with a book manuscript. Parts of the material contained herein were presented in a seminar at the Department of Mathematics at the University of Vienna, as well as at a workshop on evolutionary game theory in Bielefeld. The final version of the manuscript has certainly benefitted from critical comments and suggestions by the participants of both the seminar and the workshop. Thanks are also due to S. Bomzede Barba, R. Burger, G. Danninger, J. Hofbauer, R. Selten, K. Sigmund, G. Stiastny and F. Weising. The cooperation of W. Muller from Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, is gratefully acknowledged. Vienna, November 1988 Immanuel M. Bomze Benedikt M. Potscher III Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Strategies and payoffs 5 2. 1. A general setting for evolutionary game theory 6 2. 2. Mixed strategies and population games 8 2. 3. Finite number of strategies . . . . . 13 2. 4. Infinitely many (pure) strategies 15 2. 5. Structured populations: asymmetric contests and multitype games 17 2. 6. Additional remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. Evolutionary stability 25 3. 1. Definition of evolutionary stability 25 3. 2. Evolutionary stability and solution concepts in classical game theory 30 3. 3. Conditions for evolutionary stability based on the normal cone 31 3. 4.


Dynamic Optimization
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Author: Arthur E. Bryson

Dynamic Optimization takes an applied approach to its subject, offering many examples and solved problems that draw from aerospace, robotics, and mechanics. The abundance of thoroughly tested general algorithms and Matlab codes provide the student with the practice necessary to master this inherently difficult subject, while the realistic engineering problems and examples keep the material interesting and relevant.


Readings in Games and Information
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Brand: Eric Rasmusen

This highly original collection brings together contemporary articles from a variety of sources to present the key topics in game theory. The book includes a combination of classic and contemporary readings from a range of books and journals that together present a complete resource for students and researchers of game theory.
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 Readings in Games and Information


