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Game Theory


Games of No Chance (Mathematical Sciences Research Institute Publications)

Games of No Chance (Mathematical Sciences Research Institute Publications) Lowest new price: $61.41
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Is Nine-Men's Morris, in the hands of perfect players, a win for white or for black--or a draw? Can king, rook, and knight always defeat king and two knights in chess? What can Go players learn from economists? What are nimbers, tinies, switches, minies? This book deals with combinatorial games, that is, games not involving chance or hidden information. Their study is at once old and young: though some games, such as chess, have been analyzed for centuries, the first full analysis of a nontrivial combinatorial game (Nim) only appeared in 1902. This book deals with combinatorial games, that is, games not involving chance or hidden information. Their study is at once old and young: though some games, such as chess, have been analyzed for centuries, the first full anlaysis of a nontrivial combinatorial game (Nim) only appeared in 1902. The first part of this book will be accessible to anyone, regardless of background: it contains introductory expositions, reports of unusual contest between an angel and a devil. For those who want to delve more deeply, the book also contains combinatorial studies of chess and Go; reports on computer advances such as the solution of Nine-Men's Morris and Pentominoes; and new theoretical approaches to such problems as games with many players. If you have read and enjoyed Martin Gardner, or if you like to learn and analyze new games, this book is for you.

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The S.E.X. Blackjack System

The S.E.X. Blackjack System Lowest used price: $17.00
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Author: Alan Mandel
Brand: Brand: Bronx Books

Book by Mandel, Alan

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Foundations of Game Theory: Noncooperative Games

Foundations of Game Theory: Noncooperative Games Lowest used price: $89.99
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Author: Nicolai N. Vorob'Ev

The English edition differs only slightly from the Russian original. The main struc­ tural difference is that all the material on the theory of finite noncooperative games has been collected in Chapter 2, with renumbering of the material of the remain­ ing chapters. New sections have been added in this chapter: devoted to general questions of equilibrium theory in nondegenerate games, subsections 3.9-3.17, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr.; and § 4, by A.G. Chernyakov; and § 5, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr., on the computational complexity of the process of finding equilibrium points in finite games. It should also be mentioned that subsections 3.12-3.14 in Chapter 1 were written by E.B. Yanovskaya especially for the Russian edition. The author regrets that the present edition does not reflect the important game-theoretical achievements presented in the splendid monographs by E. van Damme (on the refinement of equilibrium principles for finite games), as well as those by J.e. Harsanyi and R. Selten, and by W. Giith and B. Kalkofen (on equilibrium selection). When the Russian edition was being written, these direc­ tions in game theory had not yet attained their final form, which appeared only in quite recent monographs; the present author has had to resist the temptation of attempting to produce an elementary exposition of the new theories for the English edition; readers of this edition will find only brief mention of the new material.


Global Interdependence: Simulation and Gaming Perspectives : Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference of the International Simulation and Ga

Global Interdependence: Simulation and Gaming Perspectives : Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference of the International Simulation and Ga Lowest new price: $99.56
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Author: D. Crookall

This volume records the proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Con­ ference of the International Simulation and Gaming Association (ISAGA), 15-19 July, 1991, Kyoto, Japan, sponsored by the Science Council of Japan and the Japanese Association of Simulation and Gaming (JASAG). The con­ ference theme was Global Modeling for Solving Global Problems. The first 2 days of the conference were held in the magnificent Kyoto International Conference Hall; the 3rd day was spent admiring the floats of the famous Gion Festival in the exquisite city of Kyoto and the Daibutsu (or Great Buddha) of the Todaiji Temple in Nara and visiting one of the Sharp factories. During the last 2 days of the conference we were made most welcome in the Faculty of International Relations of Ritsumeikan University. The day after the conference, a number of delegates went to Hiroshima (the Peace Memorial Hall, Museum and Park) and also to one of Japan's "Scenic Trio," the island of Miyajima with its breathtaking views and the Itsukushima Shrine. The conference was attended by some 400 delegates from over 30 different countries. Over 100 sessions, both theoretical and practical, were given: keynote speeches, round-table discussions, workshops, papers. This volume reflects most of those sessions, in the form of either a full paper or a short abstract.


Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 365)

Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 365) Lowest new price: $40.86
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Author: Gerald A. Heuer

A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T > 1 and the penalty v > 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. Such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mainly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory.


004: Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction

004: Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction Lowest new price: $69.64
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The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume IV Social and Political Interaction contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria are analysed.


2: Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets

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This paper represents the collaborative work of a game theorist and a policy analyst in an attempt to examine severa! questions that go to the hearl of the way individuala achieve social order. The capacity of any individual to undertake long-term, productive activities that affect and are affected by the actiona of other individuala dependa upon gaining a minimallevel of predictability among those involved. No one could successfully drive to work if the behavior of other drivera were noi relatively predictable. No one could operate a stare, if potential consumers did not purcha. se, rather than stea!, the commodities offered to the public. No one would ma. ke a. ny investments other than those tha. t would be made by a solitary individual in an isolated setting (the cla. ssic Robinson Crusoe situation). One of the ways that individuals achieve predictability in social arrangements is to a. gree to follow a set of normative prescriptions a. bout what they must, must not, or may do. Agreeing to a set of prescriptions is relatively easy. Actually following those prescriptions over time when temptations arise offering potentially high payoffs, is not at all easy. In natural settings, individUala follow agreed upon prescriptions to a greater or lesser extent depending on enforcement levels. A frequent assumption made by policy ana. lysts a. nd game theorists is tha. t enforcement is externa! to the situa. tion under analysis. That a.


Differential Games: Developments in Modelling and Computation : Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Differential Games and Applications

Differential Games: Developments in Modelling and Computation : Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Differential Games and Applications Lowest new price: $50.01
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Author: R. P. Hamalainen


Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability (Lecture Notes in Economics & Mathematical Systems)

Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability (Lecture Notes in Economics & Mathematical Systems) Lowest used price: $19.99
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Author: Immanuel M. Bomze

These Lecture Notes arose from discussions we had over a working paper written by the first author in fall 1987. We decided then to write a short paper about the basic structure of evolutionary stability and found ourselves ending up with a book manuscript. Parts of the material contained herein were presented in a seminar at the Department of Mathematics at the University of Vienna, as well as at a workshop on evolutionary game theory in Bielefeld. The final version of the manuscript has certainly benefitted from critical comments and suggestions by the participants of both the seminar and the workshop. Thanks are also due to S. Bomze-de Barba, R. Burger, G. Danninger, J. Hofbauer, R. Selten, K. Sigmund, G. Stiastny and F. Weising. The co-operation of W. Muller from Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, is gratefully acknowledged. Vienna, November 1988 Immanuel M. Bomze Benedikt M. Potscher III Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Strategies and payoffs 5 2. 1. A general setting for evolutionary game theory 6 2. 2. Mixed strategies and population games 8 2. 3. Finite number of strategies . . . . . 13 2. 4. Infinitely many (pure) strategies 15 2. 5. Structured populations: asymmetric contests and multitype games 17 2. 6. Additional remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. Evolutionary stability 25 3. 1. Definition of evolutionary stability 25 3. 2. Evolutionary stability and solution concepts in classical game theory 30 3. 3. Conditions for evolutionary stability based on the normal cone 31 3. 4.


Theory of Heuristic Information in Game-Tree Searches (Symbolic Computation. Artificial Intelligence)

Theory of Heuristic Information in Game-Tree Searches (Symbolic Computation. Artificial Intelligence) Lowest new price: $288.71
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Author: Chun-Hung Tzeng


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