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Game Theory

An Introduction To Game-theoretic Modelling

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Author: Michael Mesterton Gibbons

This book is about using game theory in mathematical modelling. It is an introductory text, covering the basic ideas and methods of game theory as well as the necessary ideas from the vast spectrum of scientific study where the methods are applied. It has by now become generally apparent that game theory is a fascinating branch of mathematics with both serious and recreational applications. Strategic behavior arises whenever the outcome of an individual's action depends on actions to be taken by other individuals - whether human, as in the Prisoners' Dilemma, or otherwise, as in the 'duels of damselflies'. As a result, game-theoretic mathematical models are applicable in both the social and natural sciences.In reading this book, you can learn not just about game theory, but also about how to model real situations so that they can be analyzed mathematically. Mesterton-Gibbons includes the familiar game theory examples where they are needed for explaining the mathematics or when they provide a valuable application. There are also plenty of new examples, in particular from biology, such as competitions for territory or mates, games among kin versus games between kin, and cooperative wildlife management. Prerequisites are modest. Students should have some mathematical maturity and a familiarity with basic calculus, matrix algebra, probability, and some differential equations.As Mesterton-Gibbons writes, 'The recurring theme is that game theory is fun to learn, doesn't require a large amount of mathematical rigor, and has great potential for application'. This new edition contains a significant amount of updates and new material, particularly on biological games. An important chapter on population games now has virtually all new material. The book is absolutely up-to-date with numerous references to the literature. Each chapter ends with a commentary which surveys current developments.

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Oval Track and Other Permutation Puzzles (Classroom Resource Materials)

Oval Track and Other Permutation Puzzles (Classroom Resource Materials) Lowest new price: $36.63
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Author: John O. Kiltinen

Popular puzzles such as the Rubik's cube and so-called oval track puzzles give a concrete representation to the theory of permutation groups. They are relatively simple to describe in group theoretic terms, yet present a challenge to anyone trying to solve them. John Kiltinen shows how the theory of permutation groups can be used to solve a range of puzzles. There is also an accompanying CD that can be used to reduce the need for carrying out long calculations and memorising difficult sequences of moves. This book will prove useful as supplemental material for students taking abstract algebra courses. It provides a real application of the theory and methods of permutation groups, one of the standard topics. It will also be of interest to anyone with an interest in puzzles and a basic grounding in mathematics. The author has provided plenty of exercises and examples to aid study.

The S.E.X. Blackjack System

The S.E.X. Blackjack System Lowest new price: $158.68
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Author: Alan Mandel
Brand: Brand: Bronx Books

Book by Mandel, Alan


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Foundations of Game Theory: Noncooperative Games

Foundations of Game Theory: Noncooperative Games Lowest used price: $20.78
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Author: Nicolai N. Vorob'Ev

The English edition differs only slightly from the Russian original. The main struc­ tural difference is that all the material on the theory of finite noncooperative games has been collected in Chapter 2, with renumbering of the material of the remain­ ing chapters. New sections have been added in this chapter: devoted to general questions of equilibrium theory in nondegenerate games, subsections 3.9-3.17, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr.; and § 4, by A.G. Chernyakov; and § 5, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr., on the computational complexity of the process of finding equilibrium points in finite games. It should also be mentioned that subsections 3.12-3.14 in Chapter 1 were written by E.B. Yanovskaya especially for the Russian edition. The author regrets that the present edition does not reflect the important game-theoretical achievements presented in the splendid monographs by E. van Damme (on the refinement of equilibrium principles for finite games), as well as those by J.e. Harsanyi and R. Selten, and by W. Giith and B. Kalkofen (on equilibrium selection). When the Russian edition was being written, these direc­ tions in game theory had not yet attained their final form, which appeared only in quite recent monographs; the present author has had to resist the temptation of attempting to produce an elementary exposition of the new theories for the English edition; readers of this edition will find only brief mention of the new material.

Global Interdependence: Simulation and Gaming Perspectives : Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference of the International Simulation and Ga

Global Interdependence: Simulation and Gaming Perspectives : Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference of the International Simulation and Ga Lowest new price: $99.56
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Author: D. Crookall

This volume records the proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Con­ ference of the International Simulation and Gaming Association (ISAGA), 15-19 July, 1991, Kyoto, Japan, sponsored by the Science Council of Japan and the Japanese Association of Simulation and Gaming (JASAG). The con­ ference theme was Global Modeling for Solving Global Problems. The first 2 days of the conference were held in the magnificent Kyoto International Conference Hall; the 3rd day was spent admiring the floats of the famous Gion Festival in the exquisite city of Kyoto and the Daibutsu (or Great Buddha) of the Todaiji Temple in Nara and visiting one of the Sharp factories. During the last 2 days of the conference we were made most welcome in the Faculty of International Relations of Ritsumeikan University. The day after the conference, a number of delegates went to Hiroshima (the Peace Memorial Hall, Museum and Park) and also to one of Japan's "Scenic Trio," the island of Miyajima with its breathtaking views and the Itsukushima Shrine. The conference was attended by some 400 delegates from over 30 different countries. Over 100 sessions, both theoretical and practical, were given: keynote speeches, round-table discussions, workshops, papers. This volume reflects most of those sessions, in the form of either a full paper or a short abstract.

Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi

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The unifying theme of the 23 contributions to this book is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John C. Harsanyi on game theory, social choice, and the philosophy of science finds an echo in these essays. Contributions by well known game theorists and economists present a great variety of stimulating theoretical investigations. Part I contains six papers on non-cooperative game theory written by Maschler, Owen, Myerson, Peleg, Rosenmüller, Hart and Mas-Collel. Part II with three contributions by Kalei, Samet, van Damme, d'Aspremont, and Gérard-Varet is devoted to the use of non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of problems of mechanism design. Basic questions of non-cooperative game theory are discussed in three essays by Güth, Hardin, and Sugden in Part III. Applied game models are discussed in three papers by Friedman, Selten, and Shubik in Part IV. Problems of social choice are investigated in Part V which deals with utilitarianism and related topics in five contributions by Hammond, Binmore, Arrow, Roemer, and Broome. Finally, Part VI contains three papers: an interdisciplinary comparison of physics and economics by Samuelson, a methodological essay by Brock, and an appraisal of the work of John C. Harsanyi.

Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 365)

Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 365) Lowest new price: $40.46
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Author: Gerald A. Heuer

A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T > 1 and the penalty v > 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. Such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mainly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory.

Game Equilibrium Models III: Strategic Bargaining

Game Equilibrium Models III: Strategic Bargaining Lowest new price: $100.52
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The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.

Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets

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This paper represents the collaborative work of a game theorist and a policy analyst in an attempt to examine severa! questions that go to the hearl of the way individuala achieve social order. The capacity of any individual to undertake long-term, productive activities that affect and are affected by the actiona of other individuala dependa upon gaining a minimallevel of predictability among those involved. No one could successfully drive to work if the behavior of other drivera were noi relatively predictable. No one could operate a stare, if potential consumers did not purcha. se, rather than stea!, the commodities offered to the public. No one would ma. ke a. ny investments other than those tha. t would be made by a solitary individual in an isolated setting (the cla. ssic Robinson Crusoe situation). One of the ways that individuals achieve predictability in social arrangements is to a. gree to follow a set of normative prescriptions a. bout what they must, must not, or may do. Agreeing to a set of prescriptions is relatively easy. Actually following those prescriptions over time when temptations arise offering potentially high payoffs, is not at all easy. In natural settings, individUala follow agreed upon prescriptions to a greater or lesser extent depending on enforcement levels. A frequent assumption made by policy ana. lysts a. nd game theorists is tha. t enforcement is externa! to the situa. tion under analysis. That a.

Differential Games: Developments in Modelling and Computation : Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Differential Games and Applications

Differential Games: Developments in Modelling and Computation : Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Differential Games and Applications Lowest new price: $65.00
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Author: R. P. Hamalainen

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